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Terrorists, bandits, spooks and thieves… 
Russian demonisation of the Chechens prior to and since 9/11 
By Dr John Russell (University of Bradford) 
 
Abstract
 
 The Russo-Chechen conflict, arguably the bloodiest confrontation in 
Europe since World War II, only attracts the attention of the Western media when the 
Chechens stage terrorist ‘spectaculars’ such as the ‘Nord-Ost’ or Beslan sieges.  Putin’s 
uncompromisingly tough line against the Chechens is popular amongst an ethnic Russian 
electorate traumatised since its own ‘Black September’ in 1999.  Since 9/11, this conflict 
has been presented almost exclusively as Russia’s front line in the international ‘war on 
terrorism’.  All Chechens who oppose Putin’s policies in Chechnya are dismissed as 
‘terrorists’ and ‘bandits’.  Yet a satisfactory political resolution of the conflict seems far 
off; thousands of Chechen civilians continue to suffer and die.  Russia’s attempt at 
‘Chechenisation’ of the conflict appears to have achieved its ‘Palestinisation’.  How far 
has the policy of demonising the Chechens, which helped Yeltsin and Putin to launch their 
respective wars, become a major obstacle to peace in Chechnya? 
 
Those engaged in studying the conflict in Chechnya are aware that that public concern in 
the West over one of the bloodiest confrontations on the European continent since World 
War II remains uncharacteristically low.  How is it that the two Russo-Chechen wars 
(1994-1996 and 1999 to date), which have cost perhaps as many as 200,000 lives,1 mainly 
civilians, or more than one-fifth of the entire Chechen population, as well as those of 
25,000 Russian forces,2 are barely mentioned in any meetings of the G-8, NATO or 
European Union, or even in national parliaments in Western Europe?3 
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Clearly, the geographic location of the conflict exacerbates what has been termed 
‘complexity fatigue’.4  During the NATO campaign in Kosovo, memories were 
resurrected of Neville Chamberlain’s infamous description of the German attack on 
Czechoslovakia as ‘a quarrel in a faraway country between peoples of whom we know 
nothing’.5
 
  Demonstrably, people in Western Europe have found it difficult enough to get 
to grips with the consequences of the collapse of the socialist bloc in the Balkans and 
Central Europe, let alone comprehend the ethnic and territorial implications of the break-
up the Soviet Union including the constituent parts of the Russian Federation.  Chechnya, 
which does indeed lie in the southeastern corner of Europe, remains for most West 
Europeans a faraway country and the Chechens, a people of whom they know little or 
nothing.  Political leaders in Western Europe and the United States are well aware that 
this region only registers on their public’s political radar screen at the time of such 
terrorist ‘spectaculars as ‘Nord-Ost’ in 2002 and Beslan in 2004 and, to the 
disappointment of those NGOs and individuals that have engaged with the complexities 
of this conflict, appear to adopt a policy of ‘appeasement’ in allowing President Putin 
virtually a free hand in Russia’s crude handling of Chechen self-determination. 
Of course, the Chechen wars on occasions have hit the headlines in the Western press.  
However, this, too, tended to be only when Chechen insurgents launched ‘terrorist 
spectaculars’.  In the first war these included the taking of hostages at Budennovsk (June 
1995) and Kizlyar (January 1996)  and, in the second, the Nord-Ost theatre siege (October 
2002), the ‘Black Widow’ suicide bombings throughout 2003 and the Beslan school siege 
in September 2004.  Significantly, the events of the first war were not generally referred 
to in the Western press as ‘terrorist attacks’, whereas those in the current war routinely 
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were, especially after 9/11, since when the Western public has tended to perceive the 
Chechens, as it were, through Russian eyes.  The ‘rebels’, ‘armed resistance ’ and 
‘freedom fighters’ of the first war have been replaced in the public perception by the 
‘Islamic terrorists’ of the second. 
 
Paradoxically, due to the popularity in translation of the works written during the Great 
Caucasian War (1817-64) by Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoi, Western readers prior to 
the Russo-Chechen wars, and to some extent right up until 9/11, tended to share the same 
highly romanticised perception of the freedom loving, savage yet brave and honourable 
Chechens and their fellow mountain peoples with that of the native American Indians as 
portrayed by James Fennimore Cooper’s ‘Last of the Mohicans’ (1826) or the Scottish 
highlanders in Walter Scott’s ‘Rob Roy’ (1817).  What all three groups represent, of 
course, is the romantic writer’s nostalgia for a traditional tribal/clan-based way of life, 
tinged with regret that its suppression and extinction are inevitable given its 
incompatibility with the demands of modernising, ‘civilised’ societies.   
Demonisation of the Chechens - The Russian and Soviet legacy 
 
The grim reality was that the military confrontation with modern civilisation, in these 
three cases, led to defeat followed by the mukhadzhirstvo (deportation) in 1864 for the 
Chechens, the Removal Acts for the Indians and the clearances for the Highlanders, all 
effectively destroying the old way of life.6  A common experience, too, was that the 
injustice, brutality and unequal struggle that accompanied the suppression of the natives, 
however much this was justified by the perpetrators, left those on the receiving end with a 
sense of collective cultural superiority over the invading ‘barbarians’.  This is graphically 
described by Leo Tolstoi in Hadji-Murat, his tale set in Chechnya in the 1850’s: 
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Nobody spoke of hate towards the Russians.  The feeling, which all Chechens 
large and small experienced, was stronger than hate.  It was not hate, but a refusal 
to accept these Russian dogs as people and such repugnance, loathing and 
bewilderment at the clumsy cruelty of these creatures that the desire to destroy 
them, like the desire to destroy rats, poisonous spiders and wolves, was as natural 
a feeling as that of self-preservation.7
 
 
For their part, the Russians, although sharing a positive perception of the djigit (mounted 
mountain warrior), have always counterbalanced it with the negative ‘bogeyman’ image 
of the ‘wicked Chechen’ who ‘whets his dagger keen’ in Lermontov’s famous ‘Cossack 
Lullaby’.8
 
  Although the average Russian would be hard put to distinguish between a 
Cherkess or Kabardinian (let alone an Ingush) and a Chechen, it is the Chechens that have 
entered the Russian imagination as the epitome of this negative perception.  This is not 
just because they are the most numerous of the North Caucasian ethnic groups, but also 
because even the neighbouring mountain peoples regard them as being the most 
aggressive and uncompromisingly hostile to Russian rule. 
Prior to the first Russian incursion in the 19th century, the Chechens had won already a 
fearsome reputation for being the most skilled and daring raiders, sweeping down from 
the mountains to steal livestock, hostages and women and slaves.  It was at the request of 
the Georgians in 1805 that Imperial Russia set out to finally suppress the Chechens.  
Indicatively, in the first agreement of this campaign to be signed by Chechen elders in 
1806 with Russian General Khudovich, setting out the terms upon which the Chechen 
people might become subjects of the Russian Empire, one clause states: 
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‘Finally, if the Chechens do not refrain from carrying out raids, they must expect to be 
completely exterminated and destroyed’.9
 
  The message was clear: abandon your old 
ways or die. 
The ambiguity of the Russians’ perception of the Chechens is perhaps best summed up by 
the evolution of the word abrek, which in Lermontov’s time meant a lone armed and 
mounted outlaw resisting Russian rule, traditionally portrayed, rifle in hand, on a hilltop 
silhouetted like a wolf against the moon,10 but by the beginning of the 20th century had 
acquired the less positive connotation of a blagorodnyi razboinik (noble robber).11  By 
Soviet times, following fierce Chechen resistance first to the Bolshevik Revolution, then 
to the collectivisation of agriculture and, finally, to alleged support for the Nazi invaders, 
this word had become a totally negative ‘enemy of the state’.12
 
 
Although Stalin used this epithet against millions of individuals during his reign of terror, 
he was selective in collectively punishing whole peoples, as he did the Chechens and 9 
other minorities before, during and after the Great Patriotic War (1941-45).13
 
  Along with 
the mass deportations to Turkey and the Middle East in 1864, the injustice of the enforced 
exile to Siberia and Kazakhstan in 1944 of every last Chechen man, woman and child is 
etched deeply in the collective cultural narrative of the Chechen people 
It has been argued that, apart from military considerations,14
 
 there was an ideological 
logic to Stalin’s deportation of entire peoples.  Steven T Katz writes: 
The Stalinist program of complete cultural conversion through 
migration…directly and indirectly caused up to 500,000 deaths.  It is therefore a 
 6 
paradigmatic instance of ethnocide facilitated through mass murder.  But it was 
neither intended, nor did it become in practice, an example of physical 
extermination of a minority nation.  The intent was to destroy a variety of minority 
cultures and the ambitions built upon them, rather than to murder all the members 
of a specific people.15
 
 
Yet, in effect, Stalin’s so-called ‘socialist culture’ was a thinly disguised version of the 
Russian culture that the Chechens had fought so hard for so long to resist.  Paradoxically, 
therefore, it led to a strengthening in exile of the Chechen self-reliance and the teip (clan) 
structure that helped sustain this.16  Unsurprisingly, the return to Chechnya failed in itself 
to resolve the Russo-Chechen relationship, the Russians still demanding assimilation to 
Soviet ‘proletarian’ norms and the Chechens seeking to restore their traditional customs 
(adat) and code of honour (nokhchallah). 17
 
 
Unequipped or unwilling to follow the opportunities in the oil industry or collectivised 
agriculture available in the Soviet Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic, many 
Chechens turned to the nascent ‘grey’ and ‘black’ economies that were to thrive in the 
USSR under Brezhnev.  This produced considerable profits for the Chechens and 
resentment from the Russians, who felt that they were being ripped off. 
 
The link between the deportations and Chechen involvement in organised crime was 
encapsulated well in an interview given to a Western writer by a Moscow detective: 
 
They had a strong clan system, based on family ties…Every Chechen youth was 
taught to obey and respect his elders and distrust outsiders.  They were also 
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addicted to firearms as a way of settling disputes or merely demonstrating 
prowess…They seemed to me very similar to the Sicilian mafia…When the 
Chechens were finally permitted to return after the war, they discovered that their 
best land had been occupied by strangers.  What else could many of them do but 
turn to crime? …It was a logical step to turn their clans into criminal groups.18
 
 
As the power and influence of the Chechen gangs grew, the transition in the stereotype of 
Chechens held by both the authorities and the public in Russia from that of abrek to that 
of vor (thief) or bandit (bandit) was not at all difficult.  By the time the Soviet system 
collapsed in 1991, it was widely recognised that, of all the mafia groups: ‘the most 
successful were the Chechens and their hallmark was extreme violence’.19
 
  Certainly, the 
Chechen mafia, established in the major Russian cities, was well placed to exploit the 
opportunities afforded by the post-Soviet transition to a market economy. 
Historically, then, the relationship between the Russians and the Chechens has been 
characterised by the Russian willingness to use overwhelming might to suppress the 
Chechen’s distinctive understanding of freedom20
 
 and the Chechens sporadically fighting 
back while stubbornly refusing to submit to Russian rule.  Given the asymmetry of the 
human and military resources in this confrontation, it is not surprising that the Russians 
have managed to subdue the Chechens for much of the past two hundred years.  Although 
it could be argued that, unlike the Nazis attitudes to Untermenschen, neither the Russians 
nor the Soviets wished to physically exterminate the Chechens, but rather to resettle and 
re-educate them en masse, such has been the brutality employed against them as a people, 
that Chechens find it difficult to distinguish ‘assimilation’ from ‘genocide’. 
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The Years of the Wolf: Russian demonisation under Yeltsin, 1991-99 
 
From its declaration of independence in October 1991 until the outbreak of the first war in 
December 1994, Chechnya was de facto independent.  Russia was more concerned with 
more immediate internal problems and was faced with a greater security threat on its 
borders, the civil war in Tajikistan, than that posed by the Chechens.  By 1993, the 
Chechens were alone in refusing to sign the new Russian Constitution, even the Ingush 
having broken away in 1992 to join the Russian Federation.  In 1994, when the Yeltsin 
administration finally focussed attention on the rebellious southern republic, a series of 
botched armed insurrections and coups were launched, culminating in the humiliating 
capture and destruction in November 1994 of a column of Russian tanks masquerading as 
Chechen oppositionist forces.  On 11 December 1994, Yeltsin launched a full-scale land 
and air attack on Chechnya to ‘restore constitutional order’, culminating in the disastrous 
assault on the Chechen capital, Grozny, on New Year’s Eve.21
 
 
Once it was obvious that Yeltsin would not achieve the quick victory in Chechnya that he 
sought, public opinion in both Russia and the West turned sharply against the Russian 
federal forces.  The disproportionate use of massive air power and artillery to flatten 
Grozny, ostensibly to ‘save’ its citizens, the incompetence of the Russian army and the 
heroic resistance of the Chechen defenders were all played out in front of the world’s (and 
Russia’s) media, with the result that support for the Chechen ‘underdog’ against the 
Russian ‘top dog’ was widespread. 
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Yeltsin’s attempts to brand the Chechen resistance as ‘bandits’ or ‘terrorists’, the regime 
‘criminal’, and its leader Djokhar Dudayev as ‘mad’ sounded like hollow rhetoric to a 
considerable proportion of the Russian population, some 70% of whom remained opposed 
to the war throughout.22
 
  Because the Chechen fighters spoke Russian and were much 
more accommodating to both Russian and Western journalists and human rights activists 
than were the federal forces, the insurgents got more than their fair share of positive 
reporting and were generally held to have won the propaganda war. 
A feature of this war of images between 1994 and 1999 was the identification of the 
Chechens, by themselves and by the Russians, with wolves.  The Chechens adopted the 
wolf as their national symbol; it featured on the flag of independent Chechnya-Ichkeria 
and figured in the first line of their national anthem.  A Chechen fighter was proud to be 
called a borz (wolf) and strove to uphold the spiritual affinity between the abrek and the 
courageous, lone wolf silhouetted against the moon. 
 
The wolf, however, figures large in the Russian imagination, too, from the host of fairy 
tales to the machismo of the wolf hunt.  Perceived to be a fearsome, cunning, fierce and 
untameable opponent, for the Russians the wolf came to symbolise the Chechen, a worthy 
enemy, but one that was wild and dangerous enough to warrant only destruction.  Lupine 
epithets were given to the Chechen leaders: Aslan Maskhadov (President of Chechnya-
Ichkeria from 1997)  – ‘the wolf with a human face’, Shamil Basayev – ‘the lone wolf’ 
and Salman Raduyev – ‘the loony wolf’. 23
 
   
The Chechen wolf theme had so caught the public imagination in the first war that it was 
quite easy for the media to resurrect it when fighting broke out again in 1999.  This time, 
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however, it was against the background of Russia’s own ‘Black September’ after which 
the public mood swung decisively against the Chechens. 
 
In the aftermath of the apartment house bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities in 
September 1999, Izvestiya headlined one of its reports of a Chechen connection ‘Wolf 
tracks’24 and Argumenty i fakty featured on its front page a pack of rabid wolves under the 
headline ‘The Chechen wolves have been driven back to their lair, but for how long?’25  It 
was alleged  that Russian guards at the notorious Chernokozovo detention camp in 
Chechnya would terrify male Chechen prisoners by calling ‘Wolves, the hunters have 
come’, before dragging them out and raping them.26  The campaign by the Russian federal 
forces to rid Grozny of Chechen fighters on 1 February 2000 was called Operation Wolf 
Hunt27
 
.   
The ordinary Russian soldiers picked up on the wolf theme but, as is usually the case in 
counterinsurgent operations, the troops soon came up with their own names for their 
opponents.  Among these were dukhi (spooks), because of the way the Chechen fighters 
would appear as if from nowhere, especially at night and melt away again; chichi and 
chekhi (both shortened and distorted variants of chechentsy - the Russian for Chechens).  
‘Chichi’ was also the name of the monkey known to all Russian children in Kornei 
Chukovsky’s celebrated children’s book, Doktor Aibolit (Doctor Ouch).  The ‘monkey’ 
theme was quite popular amongst troops, even officers, such as General Mikhailov, going 
on record to foreign correspondents calling the Chechen fighters obezyany (monkeys). 28
 
 
The Russian population at large, however, continued to call Chechens, as they did all 
other inhabitants of the Northern Caucasus cherniye (blacks), chernozhopy (black arses) 
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or by the euphemistic acronym ‘LKN’, meaning litso kavkazskoi natsional’nosti (a person 
of Caucasian nationality).  Sergei Sossinsky, wrote in the English-language periodical 
Moscow News: ‘Most city residents of peasant origin in Russia blame Jews or 
"Caucasians" (people who come from the Caucasus) for all their woes. Despite the fact 
that Caucasians (being Caucasians) are largely white-skinned, common Russians call 
them blacks or black asses. Police officials have even come up with a term "a person of 
Caucasian nationality".’29
 
  
Angry and ashamed at their forces capitulation in the first war, and horrified at 
independent Chechnya-Ichkeria’s slide into savage anarchy in the inter-war period, 
Russian public opinion was not minded to be magnanimous to its southern neighbours.  
This was reflected in the Russian media, significant sections of which had previously 
been sympathetic to the Chechen cause.  When even Russian reporters who had supported 
the Chechens during the first war were caught up in the frenzy of hostage taking, an 
inevitable and significant shift occurred in Russia on the reporting of events in Chechnya. 
 
Moreover, under Maskhadov, a leader who proved incapable either of stopping the 
excesses of the Chechen warlords, or of creating viable state institutions to tackle the 
wave of crime, sadistic cruelty and religious fundamentalism that subsequently engulfed 
it, Chechnya lost its image internationally as a brave ‘David’ fighting ‘Goliath’ and 
became perceived as yet another failed state like Afghanistan or Lebanon, when they were 
ruled by warlords.  The fact that Russia stood by and, effectively, allowed Chechnya to 
descend unaided into anarchy did little to redeem the Chechens in the eyes of a horrified 
Western world, which perceived the resurrection of some of more gruesome native 
customs as barbaric, medieval and uncivilised. 
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In Russia, the shocking sequence of Shari’a beheadings and torture of Russian and 
foreign hostages by the Chechens, which were captured on videos and widely distributed 
by both sides for propaganda reasons,30 raised anti-Chechen feeling to fever pitch and led 
to the Russian media introducing the term oborotni (werewolves) to describe the Chechen 
rebels.31
 
  Although not etymologically connected to the wolf in Russian, it did represent a 
transitional shift in the Russian perception of the Chechens from a wild animal to 
something as equally inhuman but much more sinister.  
‘Iron’ Putin takes control. 
 
Into this emotional maelstrom stepped Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the virtually 
unknown FSB security chief before he was promoted in the wake of the Chechen 
incursion into neighbouring Dagestan in August 1999.  Although this ill-advised attack, 
initiated by the more militant Islamic faction of the Chechen opposition led by Basayev 
and Khattab, was condemned by Maskhadov, it served to heighten fears amongst 
Russians of a fundamentalist Islamic assault on Russia’s soft underbelly in the Northern 
Caucasus and was a critical factor in winning over Russian public opinion for a renewal 
of military action against the Chechens.  To this extent, Putin’s rise to power – first as 
Prime Minister but by March 2000 to President - was linked closely to the hard-line 
policy adopted vis-à-vis the Chechens.  .   
 
However, it was the apartment house bombings of September 1999 that killed over 300 
Russians, which finally provoked  Russian public opinion into expressing its pent-up fury 
against the Chechens.  Whatever one makes of the conspiracy theories that point the 
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finger of blame for the explosions at the Russian authorities themselves, what is clear is 
that the ethnic Russians believed that the Chechens were responsible.32  A poll taken  
shortly after the bombs found that 64% of Russians wanted all Chechens expelled from 
the country and a similar percentage wanted Chechen towns and settlements to be 
bombed, effectively giving the Russian leadership a green light for an all-out assault on 
Chechnya.  However, as one Russian journalist was later to complain, ‘the words 
“terrorist”, “Caucasian” and “Muslim” had merged into one demonic figure’.33  Thus, 
Operation Whirlwind, launched in Moscow to round up suspects connected to the 
atrocities, affected people from all over the Caucasus.34
 
   
Upon coming to power, Putin immediately struck a chord with the Russian public by 
promising to ‘waste the terrorists in the outhouse’.35  The overwhelming majority of 
ethnic Russians, it would seem, agreed with their new leader and, two years before the 
West, perceived their renewed struggle with Chechnya as a front line battle for survival 
against Islamic fundamental terror.36
 
  Putin at once set about linking this fear of Islamic 
terrorists to the deep-seated Russian prejudice against Chechen criminality, evoking the 
following warning from an American commentator on Russian politics: 
But the most serious consequences of Putin’s continuing efforts to portray the 
Chechens as a uniquely criminal nation are likely to be felt elsewhere.  Such 
charges may very well poison relations between ethnic Russians and non-Russian 
groups within the Russian Federation by opening the door to the possible 
demonization of others.37
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Although the BBC reported, as early as 19 November 1999, that Putin had ordered all 
Russian news media to refer to the Chechen opposition as ‘terrorists’, this clearly took a 
little time to take effect.  The shift was aided significantly by the rise in profile within the 
Chechen ranks of the radical Islamist field commander, Khattab, the Jordanian-born 
‘wahhabite’ fighter who joined the first war in 1995, and Shamil Basayev’s conversion to 
the fundamentalist cause during the course of that war.  This was reflected in the Russian 
press by horror stories about the ‘wahhabites’, along the lines of ‘Diary of a Terrorist’ and 
‘Concubine of the Wahhabites’ printed under headlines in Arabic font.38
 
 
This was the background against which Vladimir Putin handily won the Russian 
presidency.  At the very time in March 2000 when he was declaring the completion of the 
rout of the Chechen armed formations while likening their leaders to ‘Nazi criminals’, 
news was breaking of a major ambush in Chechnya led by Khattab, which had left 86 
Russian paratroopers dead.  Also in March 2000, as Interpol’s new Internet site placed the 
names of Basayev, Khattab and other Islamists in Chechnya as wanted terrorists alongside 
that of Osama bin Laden,39 tank commander ColonelYuri Budanov was raping and killing 
the teenage Chechen girl El’sa Kungayeva, acts which served as the basis for the most 
high profile ‘war crime’ trial of the second war.40
 
   
The impact of these conflicting events on the Russian population was ambiguous; on the 
one hand both Putin and the army were held to be doing a much better job than had 
Yeltsin and his forces in the first war.  On the other hand, 63% of Russians were 
‘alarmed’ by the situation in Chechnya (and another 7% ‘ashamed’), against just 15% 
‘satisfied’ and 2% ‘delighted’.  A mere 12% wanted the restoration of Chechnya to be 
paid for out of Russia’s budget.  Significantly, given the signals emanating from the 
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Kremlin, the Russian population was not fooled into thinking that the war was over, 58% 
believing that the Chechen armed formations had not yet been routed.41
 
  These 
contradictory opinions: approval of Putin’s strong leadership accompanied by a strong 
desire for a resolution of a conflict that sporadically gives rise to fear and insecurity over 
the situation in Chechnya have characterised the Russian public’s attitude to the war ever 
since.  
It is clear that the Russian population had been traumatised by the events of September 
1999, as were to be both the Israelis in September 2000 with the start of the al-Aqsah 
intifada and the Americans in September 2001 after 9/11.  This was manifested in all 
three countries by intensified feelings of insecurity, an intolerance of any opposition to 
sometimes quite drastic counterinsurgency measures and an ambiguous attitude to both 
the norms of international law and the reaction of world public opinion.  In all three cases, 
too, Islamic fundamentalist terrorism was popularly perceived to be the biggest security 
threat. 
 
Putin was the first leader to link Islamic insurgencies across the world when, on 6 July 
2000, in an interview with Paris Match he noted that ‘We are witnessing today the 
formation of a fundamentalist international, a sort of arc of instability extending from the 
Philippines to Kosovo’, adding, in relation to Chechnya, ‘Europe should be grateful to us 
and offer its appreciation for our fight against terrorism even if we are, unfortunately, 
waging it on our own’.  Although he repeated this warning at the G-8 summit in Okinawa 
later that month,42
 
 it was not until 9/11 that Western leaders really took note. 
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If Putin and the Russian population sought to eradicate the threat emanating from 
Chechnya, then the Russian army generals were out for revenge against the Chechen 
people for the humiliation of the first war.  In June 2000, General Vladimir Shamanov, 
excused the killing of the wives of Chechen fighters, by asking ‘How do you tell a wife 
from a sniper?’43  A year later, General Gennady Troshev, called for the public hanging of 
captured Chechen fighters, stating ‘This is how I'd do it: I'd gather them all on a square 
and string up the bandit and let him hang, let everyone see.’44
 
  With the army chiefs 
taking such a prejudiced view, it was not surprising that the lower ranks felt that they 
could act with impunity towards all Chechens.  Unlike the first war, with a few brave 
exceptions, neither Russian nor Western media were allowed free access to the conflict 
zone.  The Russians had clearly learned the utility of ‘information warfare’. 
Having used the renewal of the conflict as a springboard to power, Putin’s political future 
was tied intrinsically to the future conduct of the war.  At any time between the enforced 
withdrawal from Grozny by Chechen forces in February 2000 right up until the summer 
of 2001, Putin could have satisfied Russian public opinion and sought a political 
settlement with his opponents.  By opting for the absolutist approach advocated by his 
generals, he was now going to have to find an alternative way out of the impasse into 
which his policies had driven Russia in Chechnya. 
 
That policy was to be the ‘Chechenisation’ of the conflict, cutting Maskhadov and his 
‘moderate’ rebels off from the political process and, in June 2000, replacing them with the 
Mufti of Chechnya – Akhmad Kadyrov - as his Chief of Administration.  All those who 
continued to advocate Chechen, rather than Russian choices for self-determination were 
demonised as ‘criminals’, bandits’ and ‘terrorists’.  The humanitarian disaster in 
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Chechnya was deliberately allowed to continue when it could, and should, have been 
ended.  In a move to further strengthen his hand in Chechnya, in January 2001, Putin 
ordered the FSB to take over control of the counter terrorist operation from the Ministry 
of Defence. 
 
If ‘Chechenisation’ was to provide a political settlement in Chechnya, Putin wanted to 
ensure that it would be one controlled by his ‘Chechens’ and his ‘Russians’ from the 
outset.  So, with the Russian public starved of information on the conflict and Western 
media and human rights organisations no longer free to operate safely in Chechnya, all 
that was required for Putin’s plan for Chechnya to be accepted internationally was for 
Western political leaders to acknowledge that the Russian president was on the frontline 
of the struggle against Islamic terrorism.  The dramatic events of 9/11 were to provide a 
most important piece for Putin’s Chechen jigsaw. 
 
After 9/11: Putin on the side of ‘right’? 
 
By the summer of 2001, only 22% of Russians listed the largely forgotten war in 
Chechnya as a major concern; compared to 66% mentioning rising prices, 59% the level 
of poverty, and 41% the rise in crime.45
 
  Although NGOs in the West continued to 
hammer Russia for gross human rights’ violations in their reports, the Western public 
appeared to be curiously disengaged from the suffering.  In the absence of any meaningful 
criticism from Western governments, Putin could continue to operate as he pleased in 
Chechnya. 
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However, Le Monde reported on 6 April 2001, that for the first time since the launch of 
the second war in October 1999, the percentage of Russians opposed (46.4%) to 
Moscow’s Chechnya policy exceeded the percentage for (42.8%).  In this respect the al 
Qa’eda attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 came at a juncture 
that was extremely fortuitous for the Russian leader.  Almost overnight, Russia became a 
key partner of the USA and its allies in the common struggle – the global war on terrorism 
- against a common foe – Islamic fundamentalism. 
 
Members of the Putin administration were quick to draw the link between the Chechen 
rebels and Osama bin Laden, the Presidential aide, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, claiming that 
800 fighters from the Middle and Far East had been in Chechnya at the start of the second 
war. 46
 
  Despite denials by the Chechen side, and doubt cast by journalists covering 
Chechnya as to the real number and influence of ‘Arab’ or ‘Islamist’ mercenaries, the 
importance of this linkage was accepted both by Western leaders and the Russian public. 
Since 9/11, the terrorist attack in Bali and the Moscow theatre siege of October 2002, 
followed by a succession of domestic terrorist-related incidents in Russia and Chechnya 
have not only kept the anti-Chechen sentiments high amongst Russians, but done enough 
to persuade Western leaders that Chechnya is, indeed, on Russia’s frontline in the war on 
terrorism. On receiving President Putin at Chequers in December 2001,Tony Blair drew 
parallels between the September 1999 bombings and the attacks on 9/11.47
 
 With such 
powerful allies as President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, Putin has been able to play 
shamelessly the ‘Islamic terrorist’ card, every time Chechnya appears on the agenda.   
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By April 2002, in his state of the union address, Putin felt secure enough to declare once 
more that the military phase of the war in Chechnya was over.48  Predictably, within 
weeks the rebels hit back to prove that it was not, choosing symbolically ‘Victory Day’ (9 
May 2002), when a bomb planted at a military parade in the Dagestani town of Kaspiisk 
killed 43 soldiers and family members and injured more than 100.  Although Dagestani 
rather than Chechen militants were arrested subsequently, they could still be portrayed as 
part of an Islamic terrorist alliance and an enraged Russian public blamed the Chechens.49
 
 
Despite hostility from the Putin administration, but in line with preferences indicated in 
Russian public opinion polls, prominent Chechens, Russians and Americans were 
meeting, in the summer of 2002 to elaborate a peace plan for Chechnya.  This culminated 
in Maskhadov’s envoy, Akhmed Zakayev, attending a major conference in Liechtenstein 
in August 2002, alongside such Chechen representatives as Ruslan Khasbulatov and 
Aslanbek Aslakhanov, the Russians Ivan Rybkin and the late Yury Shchekochikin, as 
well as such American public figures as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alexander Haig and Max 
Kampelman.  The compromise peace plan that emerged would grant Chechnya autonomy 
within the Russian territorial space.  Although, the World Chechen Congress in 
Copenhagen was to endorse this Plan on 29 October 2002, the fall-out from the ‘Nord-
Ost’ theatre siege effectively aborted this process.50
 
 
Perhaps to counter these positive developments, on 25 June 2002, Putin finally drew a 
distinction between the civilian population in Chechnya and the rebels, by claiming: ‘As 
far as the negative image of Chechens is concerned, the Chechen people are not to blame 
for anything. I think this is the fault of the federal center that the Chechen people were left 
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to the mercy of fate at some point [...] Our task is to destroy this image [of Chechens] as 
terrorists.’51
 
  
While this policy shift should have enhanced the prospects for an all-embracing political 
settlement, Putin’s failure once more to distinguish between genuine ‘terrorists’ and those 
merely opposed to his policies robbed his initiative of any real political substance.  Thus, 
no such tolerance was to be shown to any Chechen advocating a political solution other 
than that proposed by Putin.  For example, Kadyrov, who had fought the Russians in the 
first war was, to all intents, amnestied, whereas such first war commanders as Turpal-Ali 
Atgeriev and Salman Raduyev, who also took no part in the second war, were tried, 
sentenced and died, in less than transparent circumstances within a few months of each 
other in 2002, in Russian prisons.52  FSB agents, meanwhile, had apparently assassinated 
the Arab field commander Khattab, in April 2002.53
 
 
Putin’s policy of demonising the Chechens certainly had borne fruit.  The phenomenon of 
‘Caucasophobia’ amongst ethnic Russians was spreading fast and, by October 2002, 
Lyudmilla Alekseyeva, Chairperson of the Moscow Helsinki Group, had identified it as 
‘definitely the most serious problem that Russia is faced with today.  It is very widespread 
among the population in general, at all levels’. 54
 
  It was exacerbated later that month by 
the ‘Nord-Ost’ theatre siege. 
The circumstances around the ‘Nord-Ost’ siege in October 2002 have attracted as many 
conspiracy theories as had the Moscow bombings of 1999, with the finger of suspicion 
pointing at the Russian administration.55  Whatever the truth, Putin came out of the affair 
well representing a triumph for the policy of demonisation.  Although the Russian special 
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forces killed all but two of the 129 hostages and 41 hostage-takers, Putin was absolved of 
blame by his Western allies, with three groups led by Basayev being added to the US 
State Department’s list of terrorist organisations. 
 
The act of terror also further alienated the Russian public, which was quite ready to 
believe that the Chechens under Movsar Barayev were willing and able to blow up a 
theatre with more than 800 people in it.  The prominence of the ‘Black Widow’ female 
suicide bombers reminded the public at home and abroad of the parallels between 
Palestinian and Chechen tactics in the international ‘war on terrorism’.56
 
 
Putin moved immediately to put an end to the international peace plan process by seeking 
Zakayev’s extradition from first Denmark and then the United Kingdom.  At the same 
time he set in motion his own programme to hold in April 2003 a referendum in 
Chechnya on a new constitution, which would ban all political parties advocating 
Chechen independence.57  Finally, in October 2003, Putin resolved to hold new 
presidential elections.  Obviously the moves were so controlled and coordinated as to 
ensure that no one of Zakayev’s persuasion would be allowed to participate in these 
‘democratic’ processes, which as a result were not recognised as free and fair.58
 
 
By cutting out the peace process all moderate opposition, Putin’s policy effectively 
rendered impotent all those advocating diplomacy and inclusive negotiations as a means 
of reaching a political solution.  Those intent on carrying on the fight switched their 
tactics to suicide bombing.  In December 2002 trucks driven by suicide bombers 
destroyed the government headquarters in Grozny, killing 80, and in May 2003 a further 
59 in Znamenskoye.  Throughout 2003, female suicide bombers struck in Moscow, in 
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southern Russia and in Chechnya.  At over 300 dead, these attacks proved just as costly in 
human terms as the series of apartment blasts in September 1999.59
 
 
On 9 May 2004 (on Victory Day once more), the newly elected president Akhmad 
Kadyrov was assassinated in a bomb blast at a stadium in Grozny, an act for which 
Shamil Basayev has claimed responsibility.60  As soon as Putin had made clear that 
Kadyrov successor would also be a Kremlin-approved candidate, even Aslan Maskhadov 
was moved to warn that any such ‘Chechen president’ would be the target of future 
assassination attempts.61
 
   
Although since 11 September 2001, there has been a growing awareness of the danger of 
giving regimes countering insurgency a carte blanche - a Report of the Policy Working 
Group on the United Nations and Terrorism in August 2002 warned that: ‘Labelling 
opponents or adversaries as terrorists offers a time-tested technique to de-legitimize and 
demonize them’, in the post-9/11 world, Maskhadov’s stance is not likely to endear him 
or his supporters to those advocating peaceful solutions to military conflicts.62
 
  As in the 
wake of the recent tragedy in Beslan, in both the Russian and Western public’s 
perception, it is Putin that emerges as the ‘peacemaker’ and his Chechen opponents as the 
‘terrorists’. 
Conclusion 
 
By playing shamelessly the ‘Islamic terrorist’ card, Putin has effectively created in 
Chechnya a self-fulfilling prophecy.  By offering those that still advocate any degree of 
Chechen separatism a choice merely between abject surrender and continuing a campaign 
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of sabotage, any that follow the latter path are perceived in Russia and the West as 
advocates of the very Islamic terrorism against which Putin has warned. 
 
Putin is under little pressure, either domestically or internationally, to acknowledge what 
is obvious to all who have engaged seriously with the Russo-Chechen conflict: that the 
war has much more to do with unresolved conflicts left over from previous eras than it has 
with international terrorism.  By tolerating the existence of the ‘black hole’ of lawlessness 
on all sides in Chechnya and by continuing to portray even the most moderate of Chechen 
opponents as ‘terrorists’, Putin has created his own obstacles to peace in Chechnya. 
 
Perhaps, the debacle in Iraq, a change of administration in the USA or a broader 
realisation within Russia of the debilitating consequences that the war in Chechnya has on 
Russian civil society will put pressure on Putin to adopt a more humane and rational 
approach to settling the Russo-Chechen conflict.  For the present, however, the Russian 
President appears to be firmly in step with the policies of such leaders as Bush and 
Sharon, who advocate that the eradication of terrorism by force is the best way of tackling 
insurgency.  Unless this changes then a further ‘Palestinisation’ of the conflict in 
Chechnya looks more likely than any ‘Good Friday’ type of agreement to end military 
hostilities. 
 
The centuries-long failure of the Russians to accommodate the ‘other’ represented by the 
Chechens has turned a minor irritant into a costly fixation.  Writing in the English-
language publication New Times in December 2003, two Russian commentators noted 
that ‘the impression has been created that our authorities have a sort of drug addiction to 
everything connected with Chechnya.  And sometimes they react irrationally to it’.63  
 24 
 
At times, Putin’s irrationality vis-à-vis Chechnya is all too apparent, as demonstrated by 
his outburst in Brussels on 12 November 2002, when he responded to a French journalist 
asking probing questions about Chechnya by inviting him to Moscow for a 
circumcision!64
 
   
The latest opinion polls show, however, that ordinary Russians are tired of the war in 
Chechnya, 63% in July 2004 favouring peace talks, with just 24% for continuing military 
action.65  Putin could demonstrate his diplomatic skills and bring an end to the Russo-
Chechen conflict.  Clearly, this is a compromise that he does not appear eager to embrace.  
He is aware that fear of Chechen terrorism in Russia remains high, before the tragic 
events in Beslan 88% of Russians polled expect a recurrence in the near future.66
 
  In 
continuing to play on these fears, by deliberately confusing Chechen self-determination 
with Islamic fundamentalist terror, Putin is avoiding having to engage with the 
complexities of Chechnya.  Like Yeltsin before him, Putin has got a lot of mileage out of 
demonising the Chechens; he must now beware of reaping the whirlwind that he has 
sown. 
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